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Atlantic alliance. Early alliances seemed
designed to be transitory. There was no
need for cooperation, integration, preparation, or even friendship among
Bismarckian-era allies in a multipolar
world. Offensive wars were fought for
territory and treasure. However, this
situation was turned on its head when
two superpowers developed alliance
systems in an ideological struggle where
contesting armies had thermonuclear
weapons and needed to be ready to
fight for national survival on a moment’s notice. Further, NATO’s members were liberal democracies empowered to take positions independent of
the United States on any number of issues and were willing to air these differences in public.
The author’s well-informed encapsulation of the six “fatal” crises that NATO
has weathered over the years provides
scholars and interested general readers
insight, perspective, and juicy anecdotes. The author’s technique of laying
out the problem in each case and following with “what actually happened”
makes for a series of intriguing and illuminating vignettes in diplomatic history. Watching them unfold in real
time, without the benefit of opened archives and clear hindsight, was not
nearly as satisfying or rewarding.
A second cavil with the book’s title
(and the more important one) is that it
is conclusive only in the past tense. The
book is certainly a persuasive explanation as to why NATO endured. It offers
a plausible countertheory for the creation of successful and enduring alliances. However, only one of the crises
addresses the post–Cold War world in
which we find ourselves today. Indeed,
many of the circumstances that
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attended NATO’s creation and sustenance have either vanished or are eroding. Its bête noire (Russia) has ceased to
be NATO’s enemy for two decades, and
the anxieties created by imminent destruction have been replaced by lesser
threats, such as transnational terrorism
and crime. It remains to be seen if the
“self-healing tendencies” of democracies are sufficient to enable NATO to
endure in an entirely different kind of
world. The reader will benefit from
Thies’s well argued discussion of this
point.
THOMAS FEDYSZYN

Naval War College
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In Military Reform, two national security experts reflect on initiatives intended to reform defense planning
across the entire enterprise. For decades
Winslow Wheeler and Lawrence Korb
have observed, studied, and participated in defense reform, gaining a
weathered perspective on the ideas,
events, and actions taken by national
security organizations within government. This work describes the conditions necessary or common in the
national security environment in cases
where individuals or institutions have
exhibited interest in reform.
Wheeler and Korb review the issues that
underpinned defense reform initiatives
over several decades. They describe the
actions of key individuals who championed reform ideas and the issues and
stakes of those who opposed or resisted.
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Each reform movement that the authors study is recounted in a style like
that of a novel. Wheeler and Korb take
the time to develop reformers like characters in stories. The value of this approach is that the reader gains added
insight into the people involved in these
ideas and decisions and into the impact
that their experiences, knowledge, and
personalities had on the period of
reform.
Military Reform conveys the complexity
of interests and institutions that compete in national defense. Defense planning is a collaborative process that
includes the armed services and agencies of the Department of Defense and
Congress. Through the use of case studies of past reform initiatives, the authors capture the impact of the actions
of these organizations from the perspectives of organizational behavior,
process, and competing interests.
For example, chapters 2 and 3 assess the
actions and influence of key members
in Congress and the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, as well as of the
senior leadership within the Department of Defense in the early 1980s. The
authors’ assessment details the actions
taken to control rising acquisition costs
in several defense programs. This case
study illustrates the impact that politics
has on defense reform, the need for a
reform leader or champion, and the impact that the news media can have in
amplifying reform issues.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that
the realities of the political environment can trump the actions of reformers, because members of Congress are
politicians and so tend to view reform
issues as political challenges or opportunities for compromise or political
gain. Members of Congress and

congressional committees have legislative processes and oversight authority
that can significantly impact the objectives and mitigate the effects of reform.
Further, though the media can amplify
issues, their tendency to focus on the
“newsworthiness” of reform issues results in a lack of “staying power.”
Defense reform is not only impacted by
Congress and the media, however.
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the impact of
previous defense reviews conducted by
the Department of Defense, blueribbon panels commissioned by the
executive branch, and thematic trends
such as “transformation” or the “revolution in military affairs.”
The organizations within the Pentagon
possess a remarkable ability to resist
change. Senior Pentagon officials are
bureaucrats, tending to view issues and
problems either as threats to established
programs and funding sources or as opportunities for increases in funding.
The bureaucratic management necessities of the Department of Defense and
competition for budget and mission
lead to perceptions that reform is a
threat to the organization.
The book concludes with a description
of what defense reform is and is not, in
terms of budget, technology, and organizational behavior. This work takes a
pragmatic approach in the study of defense reform, assessing the complex and
competitive nature of the reform endeavor within government. It is also
timely: the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review report, released by the Defense
Department in February, and the current national security environment
both reflect several of the qualities analyzed in the book.
SEAN SULLIVAN

Naval War College
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